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THE EXPANDING USE OF MANDAMUS TO REVIEW TEXAS
DISTRICT COURT DISCOVERY ORDERS: AN
IMMEDIATE APPEAL IS AVAILABLE
by Tim Gavin
Pursuant to a constitutional grant of power to "confer original jurisdic-
tion on the Supreme Court to issue writs of quo warranto and manda-
mus,"'I the Texas Legislature enacted article 1733, which provides:
The Supreme Court or any Justice thereof, shall have power to issue
writs of procedendo, certiorari and all writs of quo warranto or man-
damus agreeable to the principles of law regulating such writs, against
any district judge, or Court of Civil Appeals or judges thereof, or any
officer of the State Government, except the Governor.2
This expansive authority to issue writs of mandamus against district judges
enables the Texas Supreme Court to review immediately discovery orders
that are entered in state district courts. The mandamus power of the courts
of civil appeals is much more restricted, being limited to enforcing the
court's jurisdiction3 or compelling a "judge of the District or County Court
to proceed to trial and judgment in a cause."4 Consequently, a party desir-
ing immediate relief from an erroneous discovery order must seek a writ of
mandamus from the supreme court rather than from the court of civil ap-
peals.5
Principles of law governing writs of mandamus embody common law
requirements that the writ will issue only if no adequate remedy at law is
available6 and that the writ will be used only to correct a void, as opposed
to a merely erroneous, order.7 An order is void if it violates the constitu-
1. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 3.
2. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1733 (Vernon 1962).
3. Id. art. 1823 (Vernon 1964).
4. Id. art. 1824.
5. Johnson v. Court of Civil Appeals, 162 Tex. 613, 350 S.W.2d 330 (1961) (courts of
civil appeals lack the power to issue a writ of mandamus to correct a trial court's abuse of
discretion); Crane v. Tunks, 160 Tex. 182, 328 S.W.2d 434 (1959). The procedure to be
followed in seeking a writ of mandamus from the Texas Supreme Court is delineated in
TEX. R. Civ. P. 474. The party seeking the writ must present to the clerk a petition setting
forth the grounds for relief, a motion for leave to file the petition, and any written argument
he desires to submit. The court may require that the opposing party be allowed to reply, or
in the alternative, if the court concludes that no reply is necessary, it may act upon the
motion immediately. Once the motion is granted, the petition is filed and the cause is placed
upon the court's docket.
6. See notes 12-35 infra and accompanying text.
7. Neville v. Brewster, 163 Tex. 155, 352 S.W.2d 449 (1961). The supreme court in
State Bd. of Ins. v. Betts, 158 Tex. 83, 308 S.W.2d 846 (1958), clearly indicated that it would
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tional rights of an individual,' is issued by a court that is without jurisdic-
tion,9 or is the result of a clear abuse of discretion.' ° In order to explain
the Texas Supreme Court's attitude toward the use of mandamus to con-
trol the discretion of trial courts in discovery proceedings, this Comment
traces the evolution of the supreme court's refusal to issue the writ when
adequate relief is offered by appeal and when the district judge has not
been guilty of a clear abuse of discretion. The court's recent applications
of these two principles in the discovery context are then examined, and the
potential problems posed by the court's current attitude are explored."
I. ADEQUACY OF RELIEF BY APPEAL
The refusal of the Texas Supreme Court to issue writs of mandamus in
cases in which a party can obtain adequate relief by appeal is but one
example of the well-established bar to the writ's use when the law provides
another complete remedy. 2 Although discovery orders are interlocutory
and hence not immediately appealable,' 3 the trial judge's rulings on dis-
covery motions can be assigned as error in an appeal from the final decison
on the merits of the case.' 4 In many instances this traditional appellate
procedure provides adequate relief from an erroneous ruling on a discov-
ery motion.
not use its mandamus power to correct every error made by the trial court. In that case the
supreme court refused to interfere with the district judge's appointment of an attorney as the
statutory receiver of an insurance company, stating: "If an exercise of discretion by the dis-
trict judge be involved this Court may not assert its original jurisdiction to enforce its own
judgment, even though the actions of the district judge may have been improvident or other-
wise erroneous." Id. at 85, 308 S.W.2d at 848.
8. Exparte Henry, 147 Tex. 315, 215 S.W.2d 588 (1948).
9. State v. Ferguson, 133 Tex. 60, 125 S.W.2d 272 (1939) (district judge had no author-
ity to enter an order interfering with the enforcement of a valid state statute).
10. See notes 36-55 infra and accompanying text. Pope v. Ferguson, 445 S.W.2d 950
(Tex. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 997 (1970), contains an informative discussion of the
"principles and usages of law" concerning writs of mandamus. A detailed analysis of these
principles is found in Norvell & Sutton, The Original Writ of Mandamus in the Supreme
Court of Texas, I ST. MARY'S L.J. 177 (1969). See also Sales & Cliff, Jurisdiction in the
Texas Supreme Court and Courts of Civil Appeals, 26 BAYLOR L. REV. 501 (1974).
11. Although this Comment examines only the use of mandamus to control the discre-
tion of district courts in discovery proceedings, standards concerning the use of mandamus
are uniformly applied to all factual situations. Accordingly, guidelines set by the Texas
Supreme Court concerning the use of mandamus to control the exercise of discretion are
applied to proceedings brought in district court and supreme court alike, regardless of
whether public officials or lower tribunals are involved. See Alice Nat'l Bank v. Edwards,
383 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (principles estab-
lished by the supreme court to govern the use of mandamus against district judges also
govern the use of the writ by district courts against county judges).
12. State v. Sewell, 487 S.W.2d 716 (Tex. 1972); Aycock v. Clark, 94 Tex. 375, 60 S.W.
665 (1901); Screwmen's Beneficial Ass'n v. Benson, 76 Tex. 552, 13 S.W. 379 (1890).
13. Southern Bag & Burlap Co. v. Boyd, 120 Tex. 418, 38 S.W.2d 565 (1931). In
Thompson v. Republic Small Business Inv. Co., 464 S.W.2d 726 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1971, no writ), the court held that an order for discovery relating to a pending action is
interlocutory and not appealable except as a final appeal of the main action, but that an
order for discovery after judgment in an independent suit by a judgment creditor seeking to
discover assets upon which to levy execution is final and appealable.
14. Equitable Trust Co. v. Jackson, 129 Tex. 2, 101 S.W.2d 552 (1937); Dallas Joint
Stock Land Bank v. Rawlins, 129 S.W.2d 485, 486 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1939, no writ).
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Aycock v. Clark" is an early Texas Supreme Court decision holding that
the existence of an adequate remedy by way of appeal precluded the use of
mandamus. The relator 6 in Aycock sought a writ of mandamus ordering
the district court to change its decision and enter the judgment that the
relator believed to be mandated by the jury's findings. 7 The supreme
court refused to issue a mandamus order, concluding that an appeal from
the judgment would afford adequate relief. Moreover, the court stated that
once "the trial judge has entered a judgment,. . . we are without power in
this proceeding to correct that judgment, even if erroneous."'8
Broad dicta in several supreme court opinions, if taken literally, would
debilitate the ban on using mandamus when adequate relief is available by
way of appeal. In Cleveland v. Ward the court stated:
To supersede the remedy by mandamus authorized by the organic law
and specially provided by statute ...there must exist, not only a
remedy by appeal, but the appeal provided for must be competent to
afford relief on the very subject matter of the application, equaly con-
venient, beneficia, and effective as mandamus.'
Requiring the relief available by appeal to be as convenient as mandamus
could be interpreted as sanctioning the use of mandamus in all cases in
which the judge has entered an erroneous ruling on a discovery motion; a
remedy that must await the completion of the trial is clearly less conve-
nient than immediate review. The statement in Cleveland, however, was
wholly unnecessary to the decision. In that case two courts in different
counties assumed jurisdiction of separate causes of action involving the
same facts and parties. Injunctions issued by each of the district courts
and writs of mandamus from the two separate courts of civil appeals hav-
ing jurisdiction resulted in a judicial stalemate.2" The Texas Supreme
15. 94 Tex. 375, 60 S.W. 665 (1901).
16. The party who seeks a writ of mandamus in an original proceeding in an appellate
court is referred to as the relator and the opposing party is referred to as the respondent.
17. The plaintiffs brought an action to recover damages and enjoin the further opera-
tion of a railroad that carried freight along the streets in San Antonio adjacent to certain lots
owned by the plaintiffs. Although the jury awarded the plaintiffs damages, the trial court
declined to issue the requested injunction, and the supreme court refused to interfere by way
of its mandamus power.
18. 94 Tex. at 378, 60 S.W. at 666 (emphasis added).
19. 116 Tex. I, 14, 285 S.W. 1063, 1068 (1926) (emphasis added; citation omitted).
20. The initial suit was filed in Johnson County, seeking the cancellation of certain
notes so as to remove the cloud that they cast over the title to plaintiffs' land. Six days later
the defendants in the Johnson County litigation (hereinafter referred to as defendants)
brought suit on the promissory notes in Dallas County. The district judge in Johnson
County enjoined the Dallas court from proceeding. The defendants then sought a writ of
mandamus from the Dallas court of civil appeals prohibiting the plaintiffs and the district
judge from continuing the suit in Johnson County and ordering the Dallas County district
judge to proceed to trial and judgment. The Dallas court issued the writ in order to enforce
its jurisdiction over the Dallas County litigation. See notes 3-4 supra and accompanying
text. The plaintiffs then obtained a writ of mandamus from the Fort Worth court of civil
appeals, which had jurisdiction over Johnson County, prohibiting the defendants and the
district judge from continuing the suit in Dallas County and ordering the judge in Johnson
County to proceed to trial and judgment. The supreme court ordered the Johnson County
judge, in whose court the first suit had been filed, to proceed to trial and judgment and
prohibited the Dallas court from taking any further action.
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Court issued a writ of mandamus compelling one court to proceed to trial
and prohibiting further proceedings in the other court, noting that "[t]he
relief which might be granted in any appeal of the defendants in the Dallas
county case to the Court of Civil Appeals at Dallas is wholly inadequate to
grant any substantial relief to anyone, or untangle the instant judicial trou-
bles." 2'
The language in Cleveland requiring that appeal be "equally conve-
nient" as mandamus has been quoted by the Texas Supreme Court as au-
thority for the issuance of the writ in only three subsequent cases. 22 Way v.
Coca Cola Bottling Co.23 involved a fact situation quite similar to that of
Cleveland,24 and Fulton v. Finch25 contained a careful explanation of why
relief by appeal was not only inconvenient but wholly inadequate.26
Moreover, the issuance of the writs in Way and Fulton were premised on
article 1734, a separate statutory provision that authorizes the supreme
court to order a district court to proceed to trial and judgment.27 The
supreme court has indicated that writs of mandamus are issued more
freely pursuant to article 1734 because its enactment by the Texas Legisla-
ture provides a specific remedy for a trial court's refusal to proceed to trial
and judgment,2" a remedy that arguably is intended to replace an appeal.
21. 116 Tex. at 15-16, 285 S.W. at 1069 (emphasis added).
22. Fulton v. Finch, 162 Tex. 351, 346 S.W.2d 823 (1961); Crane v. Tunks, 160 Tex. 182,
328 S.W.2d 434 (1959); Way v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 119 Tex. 419, 29 S.W.2d 1067 (1930).
23. 119 Tex. 419, 29 S.W.2d 1067 (1930).
24. The plaintiffs in Way brought an action on a note against an individual believed to
be doing business as the Coca Cola Bottling Co. who actually had signed the note on behalf
of the corporate Coca Cola Bottling Co. As soon as plaintiffs were notified of the corpora-
tion's existence, they amended their petition, adding Coca Cola as a defendant. Coca Cola
then instituted an action involving the same controversy in another county. Each party
sought an injunction in the district court in which he filed his action, requesting that the
judge ,in the other court be enjoined from continuing with the pending suit. The supreme
court quoted extensively from Clepeland in deciding that mandamus was the only possible
means of settling the controversy.
25. 162 Tex. 351, 346 S.W.2d 823 (1961).
26. The judge in Fulton granted plaintiffs' motion for a new trial, but after the forty-
five-day period for ruling on original and amended motions for new trials had passed, TEX.
R. Civ. P. 329b, he set aside his order. Plaintiffs sought a writ of mandamus in the court of
civil appeals ordering the trial judge to proceed to trial and judgment, see note 4 supra and
accompanying text, but their request was denied. Plaintiffs then obtained a writ from the
supreme court pursuant to its art. 1734 power. See note 27 infra. Although the proceedings
in both the court of civil appeals and the supreme court were original mandamus proceed-
ings, by issuing the writ the supreme court, in effect, reversed the decision of the court of
civil appeals.
The supreme court held that an appeal would not provide an adequate remedy because
the ultimate relief sought was disposal of the lawsuit in the trial court. An appeal would
establish that the order on which the judge based his refusal to act was void, but would not
guarantee that he would proceed to trial and judgment. Mandamus was required to accom-
plish this ultimate objective.
27. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1734 (Vernon 1962) provides:
Said [Supreme]Court or any judge thereof in vacation may issue the writ of
mandamus to compel a judge of the district court to proceed to trial and judg-
ment in a cause agreeably to the principles and usages of law, returnable to the
Supreme Court on or before the first day of the term, or during the session of
the same, or before any judge of the said court as the nature of the case may
require.
28. 162 Tex. at 356-57, 346 S.W.2d at 829-30.
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In Crane v. Tunks29 the supreme court quoted the Cleveland dictum in
connection with the issuance of the writ pursuant to the court's general
article 173330 mandamus power. Nevertheless, the court discussed the to-
tal inadequacy of appellate relief at length rather than relying on the literal
Cleveland language that would authorize relief by mandamus whenever
appellate review is inconvenient.3'
The supreme court rejected the Cleveland "inconvenience" dictum in
I/ey v. Hughes,32 stating unequivocally that the inconvenience caused by
an otherwise adequate appeal would not justify the use of mandamus. The
jury in I1ey determined that the defendant in a civil assault case was liable
for the assault, but was unable to agree upon the proper amount of dam-
ages. The trial court ordered a separate trial of the damage issue, a ruling
that the supreme court considered erroneous. Nevertheless, the supreme
court refused to issue the writ because an adequate remedy was available
by appeal. Responding to the relator's contention that he would suffer
substantial hardship if required to participate in a trial on the issue of
damages before the trial court's error was corrected, the supreme court
stated that the "delay in getting questions decided through the appellate
process, or . . .[the] court costs [that] may thereby be increased, will not
justify intervention by appellate courts through the extraordinary writ of
mandamus. Interference is justified only when parties stand to lose their
substantial rights."33 The supreme court, therefore, will not issue a writ of
mandamus if an adequate remedy is available by way of appeal, and un-
der I/ey, the appellate process is inadequate only when the substantial
rights of a party are threatened.34 This substantial rights requirement,
which calls for a much more limited use of mandamus than the Cleveland
dictum, is consistent with the characterization of mandamus as an ex-
traordinary remedy that is to be used only as a last resort.35 Since the
delay and additional expense incident to every appeal do not deprive a
party. of any substantial rights, application of the I/ey analysis would bar
the use of mandamus to review most discovery rulings.
29. 160 Tex. 182, 328 S.W.2d 434 (1959).
30. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1733 (Vernon 1962). This article is quoted in the
text accompanying note 2 supra.
3 1. The Crane case is discussed in detail in the text accompanying notes 60-66 infra.
32. 158 Tex. 362, 311 S.W.2d 648 (1958).
33. Id. at 368, 311 S.W.2d at 652 (emphasis added).
34. The substantial rights standard controlled the court's decision in Hamilton v. Greg-
ory, 482 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1972, no writ), which upheld the
district court's refusal to issue a writ of mandamus. The relator sought to compel a probate
judge to determine in limine whether the contestant had the requisite interest to contest
probate of a will. Although the court of civil appeals agreed that such prior determination
was the proper procedure, it held that mandamus should not issue because the relator had
an absolute right of appeal from the probate court to the district court, where he would
receive a trial de novo. The probate court's wrongful refusal to allow a proper trial in limine
on the issue of the contestant's interest could be corrected by the district court without en-
dangering the relator's substantial rights. Id. at 289.
35. Manion v. Lockhart, 131 Tex. 175, 180, 114 S.W.2d 216, 219 (1938); Littlejohn v.
Carroll, 342 S.W.2d 622, 623 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1961, no writ).
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II. CLEAR ABUSE OF DISCRETION
A second limitation on the use of mandamus that is especially relevant
to discovery proceedings is the ban on issuing the writ to correct the per-
formance of a discretionary act, as opposed to a ministerial act, unless the
actor has been guilty of a clear abuse of discretion.3 6 The supreme court
formerly was hesitant to use the writ to correct a trial court's interlocutory
orders because of this limitation, but it subsequently has become a mean-
ingless standard that is cited perfunctorily, if at all.
At early common law, the use of mandamus was limited solely to cor-
recting a lower tribunal's performance of a ministerial function.37 Al-
though the writ would issue to compel a court to perform a discretionary
act it had completely failed to perform, the issuing court could not dictate
the conclusion that the lower court should reach.38 In Arberry v. Beavers,3 9
however, the Texas Supreme Court articulated a very subtle exception to
this common law rule: mandamus could be used to correct discretionary
decisions if an inferior tribunal had been guilty of "so gross an abuse of
discretion or such an evasion of positive duty as to amount to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of
law."'  This statement as to the propriety of using the writ to correct a
trial court's gross abuse of discretion was clearly limited by the require-
ment that the trial court's conduct amount to a virtual refusal to perform a
prescribed duty or to act at all in contemplation of law.
This exception did not mark a significant departure from established
precedent, as the Arberry court illustrated by discussing the issuance of the
36. The supreme court initially phrased the standard as being a gross abuse of discre-
tion, but in Womack v. Berry, 156 Tex. 44, 291 S.W.2d 677 (1956), the court adopted the
clear abuse test, which is the standard cited today. See note 52 infra.
37. In Arberry v. Beavers, 6 Tex. 457 (1851), the Texas Supreme Court refused to issue
the writ to compel the chief justice of Cass County to tabulate the returns from every pre-
cinct in deciding the outcome of an election choosing the county seat. The court believed
that it was within the chief justice's discretion to determine whether the returns from the
precincts complied with the provisions of the law so as to qualify for inclusion in the final
results. The court expressed the standard for distinguishing ministerial acts from discretion-
ary acts as follows:
[W]here the law prescribes and defines the duty to be performed with such
precision and certainty as to leave nothing to the exercise of discretion or
judgment, the act is ministerial; but where the act to be done involves the
exercise of discretion or judgment, it is not to be deemed merely ministerial.
Id. at 467 (quoting Commissioner of the Gen. Land Office v. Smith, 5 Tex. 471, 479 (1849)).
Similarly, in Commissioner of the Gen. Land Office v. Smith, 5 Tex. 471 (1849), the court
held that a commissioner's evaluation of the validity of a survey presented by an applicant
and his determination as to whether the land sought was vacant or was subject to a previous
claim were discretionary decisions that would not be overturned by mandamus. Once these
matters were resolved favorably to the applicant, however, the actual issuance of the patent
was a purely ministerial act that could be compelled by mandamus.
38. In such cases writs were issued upon the theory that it was the clear legal duty of the
court to perform its judicial function, which would include making all discretionary deci-
sions properly before it, so that the use of discretion when required was a purely ministerial
act.
39. 6 Tex. 457 (1851).
40. Id. at 472.
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writ in Manor v. McCall.4 The relator in Manor complained about a tax
that had been levied by the county court at a rate that was too low to
achieve its purpose. The Georgia Supreme Court held that although set-
ting a tax rate ordinarily is a purely discretionary matter, the county court
was required by law to raise a specific sum of money. By arbitrarily setting
a rate that failed to achieve this purpose, the court's action was tantamount
to evasion of a positive legal duty or failure to perform a ministerial act,
which would be controlled by mandamus under established practices.42
This limited right to use mandamus to correct a gross abuse of discretion
gradually has been expanded. In King v. Guerra43 the San Antonio court
of civil appeals, recognizing that mandamus should not issue to control a
lower official's discretionary acts, reversed the district court's decision to
issue a writ of mandamus compelling city officials to grant the relator a
license to operate an undertaking establishment. Although the court deter-
mined that the licensing decision was within the discretion of the Board of
Commissioners and was not subject to reversal by mandamus, the court
recognized an exception to the ban that would be applicable in instances of
gross abuse by a person entrusted with decision making authority. This
exception was deemed germane when "in performing the act complained
of the officers acted wholly through fraud, caprice, or by a purely arbitrary
decision, and without reason." 44 The court limited the scope of this excep-
tion by holding that the existence of any controversy as to the facts consid-
ered by the official that created any doubt as to the correctness of the
conclusion would preclude the issuance of the writ.45 A trial judge's deci-
sion under the King analysis, therefore, is arbitrary and a gross abuse of
discretion subject to correction by writ of mandamus only if that decision
is not supported by any possible finding of fact.46 The King approach
shows a more permissive attitude toward the use of mandamus than the
view taken by the Texas Supreme Court in Arberry.Y Under the Arberry
analysis, an official's erroneous decision in a discretionary matter is not
subject to reversal by writ of mandamus even if it is wholly unsupported
by findings of fact; only decisions that are equivalent to a failure to per-
form the duty enjoined can be reversed in this manner.
41. 5 Ga. 522 (1848).
42. See notes 37-38 supra and accompanying text.
43. 1 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1927, writ ref'd).
44. Id. at 376.
45. Id. at 377. As a result, a simple jury finding that the decision had been purely
arbitrary and without reason would not support the issuance of a writ if controversy existed
as to relevant facts. The court in King refused to allow the relator to substitute the discretion
of the jury for that of the appointed officials.
46. The King view was adopted by the commission of appeals in City of San Antonio v.
Zogheib, 129 Tex. 141, 149, 101 S.W.2d 539, 543 (1937), with the comment that the standard
was generally accepted in Texas.
47. In King the court seized upon the limited exception mentioned in Arberry, see text
accompanying note 40 supra, and some language in Riggins v. City of Waco, 100 Tex. 32, 93
S.W. 426 (1906), to formulate a standard governing the use of mandamus. Although the
principles expressed by the King court had been contained in these earlier opinions, this, was
the first time these principles were articulated as a definitive rule.
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Womack v. Berry4 8 was the first Texas Supreme Court decision to use
the King exception as a basis for issuing a writ of mandamus to reverse a
discretionary decision made by a district judge.49 The plaintiff in Womack
sought control of property as trustee under a trust created in his father's
will. The beneficiaries of the trust, the grandchildren of the deceased, were
to receive their share of the estate upon reaching majority. One of the
beneficiaries, who had just reached majority, had been inducted as a naval
cadet and moved that the proceedings be stayed until he completed his
four years of service.5" The plaintiff moved for a separate trial of the is-
sues pertaining to the other beneficiaries, but the district judge denied the
motion and granted the stay. The supreme court held that the refusal to
order a separate trial amounted to a clear abuse of discretion that could be
corrected by the use of mandamus."
In reaching the result in Womack, the supreme court ostensibly applied
the King standard, 2 and determined that the trial court had violated its
plain legal duty in that no facts or circumstances existed militating against
a separate trial.53 In actuality, however, there was at least some contro-
versy as to whether a separate trial should have been ordered. The dissent,
recognizing the broad discretion given a trial court in deciding questions
concerning consolidation or separation of causes of action,54 believed that
the district court in this case would not have jurisdiction to issue a final
judgment unless all interested parties were joined.55 Consequently, a valid
reason existed for denying the requested severance, and the relator had
failed to show a clear, legal right to the issuance of the writ.
The Womack decision marked a significant expansion in the use of
mandamus. Although the language in the opinion complied literally with
established precedent restricting the power to correct discretionary deci-
48. 156 Tex. 44, 291 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. 1956).
49. Other cases prior to Womack had cited the exception, but actually had issued the
writ due to other considerations. City of Houston v. Adams, 154 Tex. 448, 279 S.W.2d 308
(1955) (mandamus issued because district court's refusal to set bond for property condemna-
tion was failure to perform a ministerial duty); Stakes v. Rogers, 140 Tex. 1, 165 S.W.2d 81
(1942) (mandamus issued because district court's failure to transfer habeas corpus proceed-
ing to county where relator had been indicted was a refusal to perform a clear legal duty).
In Southern Bag & Burlap Co. v. Boyd, 120 Tex. 418, 38 S.W.2d 565 (1931), discussed at
note 60 infra, the commission of appeals, relying upon Womack, modified, but did not re-
verse, a district court's decision permitting the inspection of defendant's business records.
50. The beneficiary cited the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940, as
amended, in support of his claim. 156 Tex. at 45, 291 S.W.2d at 679. Under the provisions
of that act, any action involving a person in military service shall, on application of such
person, be stayed unless, in the opinion of the court, the ability of the person to prosecute the
action or conduct his defense is not materially affected by reason of his military service. Id.
at 49, 291 S.W.2d at 681.
51. Id at 52, 291 S.W.2d at 683.
52. The only modification added by the court in Womack was the substitution of
"clear" for "gross" in restating the standard. Although this change was made without com-
ment by the court, it is apparent that these words are not synonymous and that the clear
abuse of discretion standard would allow for a more liberal use of the writ.
53. 156 Tex. at 51, 291 S.W.2d at 683.
54. Id. at 56, 291 S.W.2d at 686 (Griffin, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 60-61, 291 S.W.2d at 688 (Griffin, J., dissenting).
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sions through original mandamus proceedings, the facts relevant to the
holding flatly contradicted this limiting language. The change in attitude
evidenced by the Texas Supreme Court in Womack ultimately enabled
litigants to seek immediate review of district court discovery orders.
III. THE USE OF MANDAMUS TO CORRECT DISTRICT COURT
DISCOVERY ORDERS
The use of mandamus in Texas state court discovery proceedings has
evolved through four distinct stages, culminating in the dissolution of the
clear abuse of discretion standard and the establishment of immediate re-
view of discovery orders. The first of these stages consisted of the use of
the writ to compel the district judge to inspect requested documents before
deciding whether they were subject to discovery. 6 The use of mandamus
was then expanded to encompass the reversal of trial court decisions con-
cerning the relevancy and materiality of the information sought through
discovery.5 7 The supreme court continued to espouse the clear abuse of
discretion standard, however, exhibiting deference to the trial court deci-
sions and restraint in the writ's use. Subsequently, the court used the writ
of mandamus to decide previously unsettled questions of law in cases in
which the trial court had erred in determining the proper scope of discov-
ery.5 8 Recently, the supreme court used the mandamus procedure to com-
pel the production of information rather than to protect a party from an
onerous discovery order.5 9 This application of the writ is so far afield of
the initial rationale for reviewing discovery orders that the supreme court
has, in essence, sanctioned immediate appeal of questionable decisions on
discovery motions.
A. Ordering the District Court to Exercise Its Discretion
The Texas Supreme Court first used its mandamus power to correct a
district judge's discretionary ruling on a discovery motion in Crane v.
Tunks.6 ° Judge Tunks ordered the plaintiffs attorney to produce the
plaintiffs 1950 income tax return and, upon his refusal, found him in con-
tempt and sentenced him to jail.6 ' The judge stayed the execution of his
56. See notes 60-66 infra and accompanying text.
57. See notes 67-71 infra and accompanying text.
58. See notes 72-86 infra and accompanying text.
59. See notes 87-105 infra and accompanying text.
60. 160 Tex. 182, 328 S.W.2d 434 (1959). The commission of appeals in Southern Bag
& Burlap Co. v. Boyd, 120 Tex. 418, 38 S.W.2d 565 (1931), altered a district judge's ruling
allowing discovery of certain business records, ordering that only relevant portions of the
books be copied and that they be returned to the defendant immediately after inspection.
The commission stated that it could reverse the trial court's decision if there was an abuse of
discretion, but did not elaborate as to the appropriate standard for determining whether an
abuse had occurred. Id. at 192, 328 S.W.2d at 570. The commission apparently believed
that its disapproval of the trial court's order was sufficient to authorize the issuance of the
writ. Although this opinion was not in line with contemporaneous decisions concerning the
use of mandamus to correct abuses of discretion, subsequent developments have shown that
it was, in fact, ahead of its time in allowing broad appellate review of discovery orders.
61. 160 Tex. at 187-88, 328 S.W.2d at 438-39.
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order pending the outcome of the plaintiffs petition for mandamus.
The supreme court recognized that a discovery order was interlocutory
and not appealable and that the usual procedure would be to raise the
alleged erroneous ruling in an appeal from the lower court's final judg-
ment.62 Nevertheless, the court believed that the threatened invasion of
the plaintiff's privacy justified immediate review through a mandamus
proceeding. The supreme court expressed concern that no appeal could
rectify an unauthorized invasion of personal privacy that already had oc-
curred.63 The trial judge's discretionary order was reversed by writ of
mandamus because he had clearly abused his discretion by ordering pro-
duction of the return without first inspecting it to determine what portions
were relevant and material to the suit.' Accordingly, the supreme court
ordered the judge to inspect the tax return and make the necessary deter-
mination of its relevancy before issuing any further orders concerning the
documents.
The supreme court's use of the expanded, post- Womack mandamus
power in Crane is analogous to traditional uses of the writ; the court,
rather than correcting a discretionary decision of the trial court, was actu-
ally ordering the trial court to exercise its discretion, an accepted function
of the writ.65 Implicit in the court's opinion is the deference that the
supreme court would have shown had the trial court made any determina-
tion as to the materiality of the returns.66
B. Correcting the Trial Court's Discretionary Decisions
The supreme court took a further step toward the emasculation of the
clear abuse of discretion standard by issuing a writ of mandamus in Ma-
62. Id. at 189, 328 S.W.2d at 438-39; see notes 13-14 supra and accompanying text.
63. Appeal of the discovery order would have been not only inconvenient but wholly
inadequate to give the relator the relief to which she was entitled. The court stated:
After the returns had been inspected, examined and reproduced by respondent
a holding that the court had erroneously issued the order would be of small
comfort to relators in protecting their papers. The question of the legality of
the court's order would become an academic one, and the objection to the
order would be moot.
160 Tex. at 189, 328 S.W.2d at 439.
64. 160 Tex. at 192, 328 S.W.2d at 440-41. The court cited Womack v. Berry, 156 Tex.
44, 291 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. 1956), as authority for issuing the writ in these circumstances. See
notes 48-55 supra and accompanying text. Although the court relied exclusively on the
abuse of discretion by the trial court to authorize the issuance of the writ, a claim could be
made that the trial court's order was void because it violated Mrs. Crane's constitutional
right of privacy. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
65. See note 38 supra and accompanying text. The court did not actually issue the writ
in Crane, but as is frequently done, merely authorized the clerk to issue the writ in the event
that the trial judge did not comply with the opinion. The practical effect is the same, and the
discussion of the following cases will not distinguish between instances in which the court
actually issued the writ and those in which it merely threatened to do so.
66. This deference was manifested in a slightly different context in Meyer v. Tunks, 360
S.W.2d 518 (Tex. 1962), in which the supreme court refused to issue the writ to correct the
trial court's decision allowing the state to take the deposition of a sheriff in a civil removal
action when criminal charges were pending. Great restraint was shown even though the
federal courts apparently had interpreted a substantially similar federal statute as requiring
a trial judge to stay the taking of a deposition under like circumstances.
1292 [Vol. 32
COMMENTS
resca v. Marks,67 a case similar to Crane. Unlike Crane, however, in
Maresca the district judge examined Maresca's tax returns and found
them to be material and relevant in their entirety prior to ordering their
production. 68 Nevertheless, the supreme court examined the returns, de-
cided that the district judge erred in his conclusion, and ordered him to
reverse his decision. The court thus used a mandamus proceeding to im-
pose its judgment as to the relevancy of the requested documents.69
Maresca, however, did not signal a radical departure from the tradi-
tional role of the writ. The trial judge had clearly abused his discretion by
failing to excise any portion of the return, 7° and the threatened invasion of
pnvacy negated the effectiveness of appellate relief.7 The distinction
between Maresca and Crane, although one of degree, assumed significance
nonetheless. The opinion and result in Maresca indicated an increasing
willingness on the part of the supreme court to grant relief through manda-
mus.
C. Deciding Unsettled Questions of Law
The next stage in the development of the use of mandamus in discovery
proceedings involved the use of the writ to decide previously unsettled
questions as to the appropriate scope of discovery.7 2 In these cases the
67. 362 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1962).
68. Id. at 300.
69. This use of the writ was sharply criticized in Justice Smith's dissent on the ground
that the court was without power to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. He
characterized this use of the writ as an attempt to control the trial court's discretion. Id. at
302-03.
70. The supreme court unconvincingly characterized this as a failure by the court to
exercise its discretion. "We can, and should, however, afford extra ordinary relief when no
discretion has been exercised, i.e., when the order of the trial judge does not separate for
protection against discovery those portions of income tax returns plainly irrelevant and im-
material to the matters in controversy." Id. at 301.
71. See note 63 supra and accompanying text. In addition to requiring the relator to
show that an appeal would be inadequate, the court in Neville v. Brewster, 163 Tex. 155, 352
S.W.2d 449 (1962), required the relator first to seek a protective order from the trial court
before applying for a writ of mandamus.
The supreme court has also reviewed district court discovery orders compelling the disclo-
sure of trade secrets. This, of course, is highly analagous to the area of income tax returns
because once the information has been disclosed, any appeal becomes moot. Automatic
Drilling Machs., Inc. v. Miller, 515 S.W.2d 256 (Tex. 1974) (trial judge's order for party to
produce documents containing trade secrets without first determining how necessary they
were for the moving party was an abuse of discretion); Lehnhard v. Moore, 401 S.W.2d 232
(Tex. 1966) (court refused to issue the writ because the secret information was relevant and
necessary to the plaintiff's cause of action and could not be obtained from any other source,
even though the relator was a nonparty and was not going to testify in the case).
72. The resolution of issues of first impression through writs of mandamus was sanc-
tioned in the federal courts by the Supreme Court's decision in Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379
U.S. 104 (1964). The district judge ordered the defendant to submit to nine physical and
mental examinations, and the defendant petitioned the court of appeals for a writ of manda-
mus directing the judge to vacate his order. The court of appeals denied the writ, but on
certiorari the Supreme Court held that mandamus was an appropriate remedy. The right to
order a defendant to submit to examinations had not previously been established, and the
Court believed that the resolution of this question warranted the issuance of the writ. The
Supreme Court thus authorized the use of mandamus as a means of advising the district
courts on previously undecided questions of law. For an analysis of the use of mandamus in
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supreme court had more difficulty finding that the trial court had abused
its discretion, since the trial court had been traversing uncharted waters, so
the court merely issued the writ without discussing the basis of its action.73
Mandamus proceedings have been used on three occasions to resolve
questions concerning the discovery of documents belonging to expert wit-
nesses expected to testify at trial.74 Russell v. Young 75 concerned the busi-
ness records of a doctor scheduled to testify on behalf of a workmen's
compensation claimant. The insurance company sought discovery of the
records to determine how many times the doctor had testified in lawsuits
and how heavily he depended upon such testimony as a source of income.
The supreme court noted that the bias and prejudice of an expert medical
witness could be elicited on cross-examination, but held that the law gov-
erning cross-examination does not govern the discovery of records. 76 The
court stated that the records had no impeachment value prior to trial be-
cause at that time there was no testimony to impeach, and depending upon
what was actually introduced during the trial, there might never be any-
thing to impeach.77
The issue in Russell was clearly unsettled; not only was there an absence
of any Texas authority on the propriety of using discovery solely for im-
peachment purposes, but there was also a split of authority in other juris-
dictions.7 Under these circumstances it would have been difficult to find
that the trial judge had clearly abused his discretion, and the supreme
court did not attempt to justify the issuance of the writ on that basis. The
court simply concluded that the records were not subject to discovery and
authorized the issuance of the writ.7 9
In State v. Ashworth8" the trial court ordered the discovery of documents
the federal courts, see Comment, The Use of Extraordinary Writsfor Interlocutory Appeals,
44 TENN. L. REV. 137 (1976); Note, Civil Procedure-Mandamus- Review of a Discovery
Order Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(4), 22 WAYNE L. REV. 179 (1975).
73. The supreme court followed this procedure in all three of the cases discussed in
notes 74-84 infra and accompanying text.
74. Houdaille Indus., Inc. v. Cunningham, 502 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. 1973); State v. Ash-
worth, 484 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. 1972); Russell v. Young, 452 S.W.2d 434 (Tex. 1970).
75. 452 S.W.2d 434 (Tex. 1970).
76. Id. at 436.
77. Id. at 437. In Exparte Shepperd, 513 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. 1974), the supreme court
limited the Russell holding by deciding that discovery could be used to uncover evidence
solely for the purpose of impeaching a prospective expert witness. Shepperd concerned a
condemnation proceeding in which the condemnees sought to discover information relating
to the prices paid for surrounding tracts of land. The purpose was solely to enable the
condemnees to discredit the condemnation expert when he testified as to the value of their
land. The court held that the documents were discoverable, unless they related to pending
litigation concerning the other tracts and were protected from discovery in that litigation.
The court distinguished Russell because it concerned (I) reports of a private or personal
nature, (2) reports that were not prepared specifically for a party to the lawsuit, and (3) an
expert whose credibility had not been put in issue. Due to the central role that appraisal
witnesses play in condemnation proceedings, the court held that their credibility is automati-
cally at issue.
78. The court cited Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 922 (1968), which reveals a split of authority on
the propriety of using discovery solely for impeachment purposes. 452 S.W.2d at 436.
79. 452 S.W.2d at 437.
80. 484 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. 1972).
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prepared by state experts in a condemnation proceeding. The supreme
court issued a writ of mandamus reversing the trial court order, holding
that the expert's appraisal reports were immune from discovery, even
though the expert himself could be compelled to testify as to the land's
value.8' The court again neglected to refer to the circumstances that ren-
dered the trial court's order void, but proceeded as if immediate review of
discovery orders was an accepted practice.
Houdaille Industries, Inc. v. Cunningham82 was the third case in which
the supreme court granted a party leave to file a petition for writ of man-
damus in order to set guidelines for the discovery of reports prepared by
expert witnesses. The court held that such reports were discoverable if a
party reserved the right to call the experts to testify, even if they would be
called only for purposes of rebuttal or impeachment.83 The court, how-
ever, failed to discuss any alleged abuse of discretion on the part of the
trial court that prompted the issuance of the writ.
The court justified its rulings in Russell, Ashworth, and Houdaille by
citation to previous cases in which the writ had issued to correct a trial
court's discovery order; the opinions did not analyze general principles
governing the use of mandamus in other contexts. By merely citing previ-
ous decisions without further elaboration, the court treated discovery or-
ders as if they were a separate class of interlocutory orders.84 In referring
to past uses of the writ to correct discovery orders as authority for its con-
tinued use, the court avoided any serious consideration of either the ade-
quacy of appellate relief or of whether the trial court had abused its
discretion.
The writ's use in Ashworth and Houdaille is distinguishable from earlier
uses in which the right to privacy was involved.85 The only potential in-
jury caused by the disclosure of expert's reports prepared for use in litiga-
tion is the loss of the advantage that the party who hired the expert would
otherwise enjoy in the ensuing trial. On the other hand, disclosure of tax
81. Id. at 566-67. The Ashworth decision is analogous to Russell, in which the supreme
court recognized that a doctor could be compelled to disclose how often he had been em-
ployed as an expert witness, but held that the records that verified his business activities
were immune from discovery. Russell v. Young, 452 S.W.2d 434, 436-37 (1970). Ashworth
was decided prior to the 1973 amendment of rule 167 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure,
which provides for discovery of reports of experts who are to be called as witnesses in the
case. The current status of the discovery of documents in condemnation proceedings is dis-
cussed in note 77 supra.
82. 502 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. 1973). Houdaille was decided after the effective date of the
1973 amendment of rule 167 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.
83. Id. at 548. The court further held that pictures were not written communications,
and hence, were not protected by the provisions of rule 167. Although rule 167 permits the
discovery of the reports of an expert who will be called as a witness, the provision does not
include "other communications" between any party and his employee made subsequent to
the occurrence upon which the suit is based and made in connection with the circumstances
out of which the claim arose. TEX. R. Civ. P. 167.
84. The supreme court followed this same approach in Commercial Travelers Life Ins.
Co. v. Spears, 484 S.W.2d 577, 578 (Tex. 1972), in which the court stated: "If the information
sought is not discoverable, a mandamus will issue to set aside the order."
85. See, e.g., notes 63 & 71 supra and cases discussed therein.
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returns and trade secrets results in injury to the party that is wholly in-
dependent of the pending suit.8 6
D. Reversing a Trial Court's Denial of Discovery Motions
The recent Texas Supreme Court decision in Barker v. Dunham87 sig-
nals a significant advance toward recognizing that trial court discovery or-
ders are subject to immediate review. The court issued a writ of
mandamus correcting an order of a trial judge that denied the discovery of
relevant information. The plaintiff in Barker was the widow of a man who
was killed in an accident involving a boom-crane manufactured by the
defendant. The plaintiff filed a motion requesting that an officer of the
defendant corporation produce all of his calculations, memoranda, and
other writings relating to the cause of the accident. The trial judge denied
the request, based upon his belief that an officer of a defendant corpora-
tion did not qualify as an expert under rule 167 of the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure.88 The supreme court held that the rules draw no distinction
between an expert who is a regular employee and one who is temporarily
employed to aid in the preparation of a claim or defense.89 Since the cor-
poration had not disclaimed any intention to call the officer as a witness,
his calculations and reports were subject to discovery under rule 167.
Although the court held that the writ could issue only if the decision of
the trial court amounted to a clear abuse of discretion,9" it failed to discuss
the significant difference between this case and earlier uses of the writ. In
this case the trial court had erred by denying the discovery of relevant
materials, rather than by ordering the discovery of privileged information.
An order of a trial court compelling disclosure of information that is not
properly subject to discovery cannot be rectified on appeal; once the op-
posing party is given access to the information, it is impossible to "wipe the
86. In Texarkana Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Jones, 551 S.W.2d 33 (Tex. 1977), the Texas
Supreme Court used a mandamus proceeding in order to decide a previously unsettled ques-
tion of law in a situation in which privacy was an important issue. The hospital was sued by
the parents of a child allegedly blinded by the negligence of two staff physicians. The trial
court ordered the hospital to produce minutes from the meetings of various hospital commit-
tees that might have discussed the circumstances surrounding the accident and from the
meetings of the hospital's board of directors. The supreme court found that the order vio-
lated TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4447d, § 3 (Vernon 1976), which provides that "[t]he
records and proceedings of any hospital committee. . . shall be confidential. . . and shall
not be available for court subpoena ...." The trial court erred in holding that the minutes
were "records made or maintained by the hospital in the regular course of business," and
were thus discoverable under the exception contained in art. 4447d. The supreme court
believed that any intrusion into the privacy of these meetings would impede the uninhibited
discussion of events that is so essential to the improvement of medical treatment. 551
S.W.2d at 35.
87. 551 S.W.2d 41 (Tex. 1977).
88. Rule 167 provides that "any party may be required to produce and permit the in-
spection and copying of the reports, including factual observations and opinions, of an ex-
pert who will be called as a witness." TEX. R. Civ. P. 167.
89. 551 S.W.2d at 43.
90. Id. at 42. Although the supreme court did cite the appropriate standard, it found
the requisite "clear" abuse without displaying appropriate deference to the trial court's rul-
ing.
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slate clean" in order to begin a new trial,9 ' and protective orders issued in
a subsequent trial are meaningless. Since an appeal does not afford an
adequate remedy in such instances, a writ of mandamus is warranted in
cases in which the trial court has clearly abused its discretion.92
In contrast, an order of the trial court denying access to materials and
documents, such as the order in Barker, does not cause irreparable harm.
If the denial is deemed significant enough to constitute reversible error, the
court of civil appeals can order a new trial, giving the parties a fresh start.
The trial judge then can correct his earlier ruling without injury to either
party. The supreme court previously acknowledged this fundamental dif-
ference between the two types of cases, noting that "[t]he reasoning in
Crane v. Tunks does not necessarily apply where a bill of discovery has
been denied."93 Granted, immediate review of the discovery order by the
supreme court might have spared the parties the expense of two complete
trials,94 but the supreme court has already stated that the additional ex-
pense and delay incident to an appeal do not justify the issuance of a writ
of mandamus.95 In Barker the supreme court failed to evaluate the ade-
quacy of relief by appeal, a traditional and firmly established restraint on
the use of the writ.96
Any lingering doubt as to whether the supreme court would subse-
quently take cognizance of the crucial difference between a trial court's
ordering and refusing to order discovery was dispelled in Allen v.
Humphreys.97 The plaintiff alleged that she contracted lung cancer as a
result of her employment in the meat department of a Safeway store, con-
tending that polyvinyl chloride particles, which were released into the air
when meat wrapping film was cut with a hot wire, contaminated her lungs
and caused her cancer. She sought discovery of any studies, reports, or
surveys dealing with the possibility of such an occurrence.
The trial judge denied plaintiffs motion, and she sought a writ of man-
damus to reverse his decision. The Texas Supreme Court rejected the de-
fendant's argument that the plaintiff had an adequate remedy by appeal,
citing Barker.9" The court perfunctorily quoted the appropriate standard
of a "clear abuse of discretion," but the hollowness of this phrase was
91. See note 63 supra and accompanying text.
92. An alternative to seeking a writ of mandamus lies in refusing to comply with the
judge's order, being sentenced to jail for contempt, and seeking a writ of habeas corpus.
Although mandamus would appear to be a far superior means of seeking review, the habeas
corpus route was utilized in Exparle Shepperd, 513 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. 1974).
93. Morris v. Hoerster, 370 S.W.2d 451 (Tex. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 919 (1964).
The Crane case is discussed in notes 60-66 supra and accompanying text.
94. There is no guarantee, however, that the supreme court saved the parties any ex-
pense. Only in the event that the party who had been denied access to relevant information
lost the trial and then convinced the court that the denial was reversible error would a sec-
ond trial be necessary.
95. See notes 32-34 supra and accompanying text.
96. See notes 12-35 supra and accompanying text.
97. 559 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. 1977).
98. The court's reference to previous uses of the writ in a discovery context as authoriz-
ing continued usages of the writ reaffirms the fact that discovery orders are being treated as a
special subset of interlocutory orders that are immediately reviewable by way of mandamus.
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clearly indicated by the court's explanation of Barker: "In a more recent
case, Barker v. Dunham,. . . we held a trial judge had abused his discre-
tion in denying discovery of certain properly discoverable information." 99
This statement implies that all erroneous trial court discovery orders are
the product of an abuse of discretion, an implication that directly contra-
dicts earlier cases holding the supreme court powerless to use mandamus
to correct merely erroneous orders.'0
°
The Allen opinion suggests that any time a district judge denies discov-
ery of information that the supreme court believes to be properly discover-
able, he is guilty of an abuse of discretion and his decision can be corrected
by a writ of mandamus. If the trial court errs in the other direction and
orders the disclosure of information that is not properly discoverable, the
relator's case for intervention by writ of mandamus should be even
stronger, since an erroneous order compelling discovery cannot be effec-
tively corrected on appeal.' O'
West v. Solito 0 2 contains the supreme court's most recent pronounce-
ments concerning the use of mandamus to review district court discovery
orders. Although the court in West reviewed an order compelling rather
than denying discovery, the light that the decision sheds on Barker and
Allen requires that it be considered at this point. The relator in West was
the plaintiff in an action to cancel various deeds and to recover damages
based on the allegedly fraudulent conduct of the defendants. The plaintiff
moved to quash a subpoena duces tecum on the ground that the informa-
tion sought was protected by the attorney-client privilege. The trial court
denied the motion, but the supreme court used its mandamus power to
reverse that decision. In discussing whether mandamus was the appropri-
ate remedy, the court stated that "a writ of mandamus may issue in a
proper case to correct a clear abuse of discretion, particularly where the
remedy by way of appeal is inadequate."'0 3 This statement may be an
oblique way of stating that the existence of an adequate remedy by way of
appeal no longer automatically precludes the issuance of a writ of manda-
mus. The traditional statement of this restraint on the writ's use would
require that the words "particularly where" be replaced by the phrase "but
only if." By using the former wording, the court intimates that there are
certain instances in which appellate review would be adequate and yet
mandamus properly could be used. Apparently, Barker and Allen are two
examples of this new class of cases that are reviewable by writ of manda-
mus. " Unfortunately, the supreme court has given no indication as to the
circumstances under which this expedited review will be granted. The
Id. at 801. For instances in which the court first treated discovery orders in this fashion, see
note 84 supra and accompanying text.
99. 559 S.W.2d at 801 (citation omitted).
100. See notes 7 & 18 supra and accompanying text.
101. See notes 63 & 91-92 supra and accompanying text.
102. 563 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1978).
103. Id. at 244 (emphasis added).
104. The court in West, however, did not cite Allen or Barker in support of its statement.
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most obvious common characteristic of Barker and Allen is that they both
involved erroneous rulings on discovery motions. If that common link de-
fines the class of orders that are reviewable by mandamus regardless of the
adequacy of appellate review, all erroneous discovery orders entered by
district judges are now subject to immediate reversal by the supreme court.
IV. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS CAUSED BY CURRENT TRENDS
The Texas Supreme Court has gradually expanded its power to correct
district court discovery orders through the use of mandamus. The initial
expansion was motivated by a desire to protect the privacy rights of indi-
viduals when trial courts had clearly abused their discretion. The supreme
court has subsequently issued the writ more freely and has displayed a
willingness to grant immediate relief from any erroneous trial court ruling
compelling discovery. This erosion of the deference that is inherent in the
clear abuse of discretion standard for reviewing trial court decisions is jus-
tified by the inadequacy of appellate relief when exposure of private pa-
pers is threatened.
The most recent stage in the evolving use of mandamus as a means of
controlling judicial discretion in discovery proceedings has created poten-
tial problems. On two separate occasions the supreme court has issued a
writ of mandamus to correct a trial court's refusal to allow discovery of
relevant documents, even though an appeal apparently would have pro-
vided adequate relief. In keeping with these decisions, the supreme court
subsequently has intimated that an adequate appellate remedy does not
necessarily bar the use of mandamus. Once it becomes known that an
immediate appeal of discovery orders is available, the supreme court will
be deluged with petitions for writs of mandamus. In addition to the oner-
ous burden this will place on the court, the immediate review of interlocu-
tory orders also threatens to impede the orderly disposition of trials. This
potential problem was recognized by the Texas Supreme Court in Pope v.
Ferguson:
There is sound reason why appellate courts should not have jurisdic-
tion to issue writs of mandamus to control or to correct incidental
rulings of a trial judge when there is an adequate remedy by appeal.
Trials must be orderly; and constant interruption of the trial process
by appellate courts would destroy all semblance of orderly trial pro-
ceedings. Moreover, with this type of intervention, the fundamental
concept of all American judicial systems of trial and appeal would
become outmoded. Having entered the thicket to control or correct
one such trial court ruling, the appellate courts would soon be asked
in direct proceedings to require by writs of mandamus that trial
judges enter orders, or set aside orders, sustaining or overruling. . . a
myriad of interlocutory orders and judgments; and, as to each, it
might logically be argued that the petitioner for the writ was entitled,
as a matter of law, to the action sought to be compelled. °5
105. 445 S.W.2d 950, 954 (Tex. 1969).
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The supreme court has taken the first step into the "thicket" by granting
immediate review of discovery orders.
V. CONCLUSION
In the future the court must retreat from the implication in Barker that
any erroneous ruling by a trial judge on a discovery motion amounts to an
abuse of discretion. The court must recognize the significant difference
that exists between erroneous orders that compel and those that deny dis-
covery of information. When discovery has been denied, the court should
seriously consider the adequacy of relief that is available by way of appeal.
In almost all of these cases, forcing a party to await the completion of the
trial in order to seek appellate review will not endanger his substantial
rights, and consequently, the court should deny the party's rule 474 mo-
tion."°6 When the trial court has improperly ordered a party to reveal
privileged or irrelevant information, the supreme court should inquire as
to the nature of the interest that is to be adversely affected by the ruling
before deciding whether to issue the writ. If a significant privacy interest is
threatened, precluding the effectiveness of relief by way of appeal, the
supreme court should be reluctant to impose restraints on the use of the
writ. Greater deference should be shown to the discretionary decisions
made by trial courts in those instances where no such right is threatened.
Something more than a mere difference of opinion as to the proper resolu-
tion of an undecided question of law should be required to constitute a
clear abuse of discretion. By analyzing the adequacy of appellate relief
and by revitalizing the clear abuse of discretion standard, the supreme
court can return the writ of mandamus to its traditional role as a useful but
extraordinary means of reviewing a trial court's orders. If the court fails to
take these steps, however, in the court's own words, "the fundamental con-
cept of all American judicial systems of trial and appeal [could) become
outmoded." 7
106. TEX. R. Civ. P. 474; see note 5 supra.
107. Pope v. Ferguson, 445 S.W.2d 950, 954 (Tex. 1969).
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